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Abstract
We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser and a provider of
health services when quality has two dimensions. We assume that one dimension of
quality is contractible (dimension 1) and one dimension is not contractible (dimension
2). We show that the optimal incentive scheme for the contractible dimension depends
critically on the extent to which quality 1 increases or decreases the marginal cost
and marginal bene￿t of quality 2 (i.e. substitutability or complementarity). If the
two quality dimensions are substitutes, three possible solutions arise: a) the optimal
incentive scheme is high powered: the incentive is equal to the marginal bene￿t of
quality dimension 1 and the optimal quality in dimension 2 is zero; b) the optimal
incentive scheme is low powered: both quality dimensions are positive; the incentive
is below the marginal bene￿t of quality dimension 1; c) it is not optimal to introduce
pay for performance as the gain of welfare from an increase in quality dimension 1
is lower than the loss of welfare from an increase in quality dimension 2. If the two
quality dimensions are complements the incentive scheme is always high powered: the
incentive is above the marginal bene￿t of dimension 1 and both quality dimensions
are positive.
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11 Introduction
Policymakers aim to design incentive schemes that encourage better performance in the
health care sector. This is often referred to as Paying for Performance. For example,
the Medicare Programme in the U.S. provides higher transfers to hospitals that perform
well according to measurable quality indicators, such as rates of cervical cancer screening
and hemoglobin testing for diabetic patients (Rosenthal et al., 2005). In the United
Kingdom general practitioners who perform well on certain quality indicators, such as the
measurement of blood pressure and cholesterol in patients with ischemic heart disease,
can receive substantial ￿nancial rewards. These can amount to about 20% of a general-
practitioner￿ s budget (Doran et al., 2006). PROMINA Health System, an Atlanta-area
federation of eight hospitals and nearly 4000 employed and outside physicians, has agreed
on sizable quality reimbursement incentives for about 1500 physicians in a¢ liated practices
(AIS, 2003). If a practice meets a certain level of compliance with quality standards (e.g.
that a given percentage of pneumonia patients must receive an antibiotic within four hours
of being admitted) they receive reimbursement for all services to CIGNA/PROMINA
patients that is set a 5% higher multiple of Medicare reimbursement than the baseline
multiple such as speci￿ed in PROMINA￿ s contract with CIGNA HealthCare of Georgia.
The Pay for Performance (P4P) programs outlined above de￿ne quality in such a
way that it is veri￿able. That is, the reimbursement contract between the payer and the
provider must be written such that quality indicators can be observed and veri￿ed ex
post by a third party (court). However, a major issue in rewarding performance is that
while some quality dimensions are contractible through performances indicators, other
dimensions of quality are not. For example, both communication about medical conditions,
and hemoglobin testing a⁄ect the quality of care for diabetic patients. While the latter
dimension can be veri￿ed by a third party, the former dimension is not. As is well known
from the contract literature, problems of non-veri￿ability and multi-tasking may impose
severe di¢ culties in e⁄ective incentive design (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Baker 1992).
Recently, Eggleston (2005) provides a model with two quality dimensions. She shows
2that if one dimension of quality is contractible, while one dimension of quality is not,
then the introduction of an P4P-program may increase service on the veri￿able quality
dimension but may decrease service on the non-veri￿able one. She argues that incentives
for non-veri￿able quality can be restored by reducing P4P on veri￿able quality.
While Eggelston￿ s argument seems intuitive, reducing P4P-incentives comes at a cost
since it reduces service on the veri￿able quality. This reduces patients￿bene￿t of treatment,
and the purchaser￿ s utility. There is thus an issue of how the sponsor (payer) should adjust
the reimbursement contract to ensure that her objectives are ful￿lled. That is, what is
the optimal strength of the P4P-incentives for the observed quality and under which
conditions is the optimal incentive positive. The purpose of this paper is to investigate
such conditions.
We show that the optimal incentive scheme depends critically on the extent to which
quality 1 increases or decreases the marginal cost and marginal bene￿t of quality 2 (i.e.
the extent to which quality 1 and 2 are substitutes or complements). If the two quality
dimensions are substitutes, we show that three possible solutions can arise. a) The optimal
incentive scheme is high powered: the P4P-incentive scheme is equal to the marginal bene￿t
of quality dimension 1 and the optimal quality in dimension 2 is zero. This result arises
when the quality dimension that is not contractible falls quickly to the minimum when the
price is raised, while the bene￿ts from the quality dimension that is contractible are large.
b) The optimal incentive scheme is low powered: the P4P-incentive scheme is below the
marginal bene￿t of quality dimension 1. Both quality dimensions are positive. This result
arises when the bene￿ts from the quality dimension that is contractible are relatively more
important but need to be traded o⁄ with the reductions in the quality dimension that is
not contractible. c) The incentive scheme breaks down: it is not optimal to introduce pay
for performance as the gain of welfare from an increase in quality dimension 1 is lower than
the loss of welfare from an increase in quality dimension 2. This result arises when the
bene￿ts from the quality dimension that is not contractible are relatively more important.
If the two quality dimensions are complements, the incentive scheme is always high
3powered. The P4P-incentive scheme is above the marginal bene￿t of quality dimension 1.
Both quality dimensions are positive.
Like Eggleston (2005) we also compare our solutions with what can be obtained if
both dimensions of quality are veri￿able. Obviously, the second best quality, when quality
dimension 2 is not contractible, is generally di⁄erent from the ￿rst best quality, when qual-
ity dimension 2 is also contractible, however not necessarily lower. Second best veri￿able
quality might be highest in second best if the two dimensions of quality are complements
in the providers costs of producing quality.
This study contributes to the literature on provider incentives in health care. Despite
the increase in the use of performance indicators, most of the existing theoretical literature
assumes that quality is not contractible (for example Pope, 1989; Ma, 1994; Rogerson,
1994; Ellis, 1998; Ellis and McGuire, 1990; Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998a and 1998b;
Mougeot and Naegelen, 2005). As quality indicators become increasingly available, quality
becomes partially contractible. Therefore, there is increasing scope for analysing incentive
schemes within this imperfect environment.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the main assumptions of the
model and derives the equilibrium price when only one dimension of quality is contractible.
Sections 3 derives the ￿rst best solution, when both dimensions of quality are contractible,
and compares it with the second best solution derived in section 2. Section 4 provides
comparative statics with respect to the price. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
There are two active players, the sponsor (the payer or a purchaser of health services)
and the provider (hospital, family doctor). The sponsor provides reimbursement to the
provider, and the provider exerts e⁄ort on two quality tasks. In addition, fully insured
patients, whose bene￿t is increasing in the quality provided on both tasks, seek treatment.
We further assume that the provider is not demand constrained.
The model is solved by backwards induction, starting with the provider￿ s choice of
4quality levels.
2.1 The provider
There are two dimensions of quality, q1 and q2: The disutility in monetary terms from
exerting quality e⁄ort q1;q2 is C(q1;q2). The disutility is increasing in quality and strictly
convex: Cqi > 0, and Cqiqi > 0; where Cqi := @Ci=@qi and Cqi := @2Ci=@q2
i for i = 1;2.
If the two dimensions of quality are substitutes, then an increase in quality 1 increases
the marginal disutility of quality 2 and Cq2q1 > 0. If they are complements, an increase
in quality 1 reduces the marginal disutility of quality 2 and Cq2q1 < 0. We also assume
Cq1(0;q2) = Cq2(q1;0) = 0.
Patients￿bene￿t from receiving quality q1 and q2 is B(q1;q2) with Bqi > 0, and Bqiqi <
0, i = 1;2: If Bq1q2 = 0 then the two dimensions of quality are independent. If Bq1q2 < 0
then an increase in quality 1 decreases the marginal bene￿t of quality 2 (the two dimensions
of quality are substitutes). If Bq1q2 > 0 then an increase in quality 1 increases the marginal
bene￿t of quality 2 (the two dimensions of quality are complements). We will consider all
these three cases.
To simplify the exposition and without loss of generality, we assume that the third-
order derivatives on patients￿bene￿t and provider￿ s cost are zero.
The incentive scheme is based only on the veri￿able dimension of quality q1. That
is, we assume that no contract on q2 can be enforced: it is prohibitively costly to specify
this outcome ex ante in such a way that it can be veri￿ed by a court ex post. Therefore,
the payment can be based only on q1 and not q2. The payment for each unit of observed
quality q1 is p ￿ 0. The provider also receives a lump-sum payment T ￿ 0:
The provider is semi altruistic. Altruism is captured by the parameter ￿ ￿ 0: Provider￿ s
utility from providing quality q1 and q2 to a representative patient is
U = T + pq1 + ￿B(q1;q2) ￿ C(q1;q2) (1)
subject to q1 ￿ 0, q2 ￿ 0. We will show below that in equilibrium the non-negativity
5constraint for quality 1 is never binding (q1 > 0) while for quality 2 it might be binding.
Suppose that quality 2 is also positive in equilibrium (q2 > 0). Then the optimal level of
quality provided by the provider are given by the following First Order Conditions (FOCs):
p + ￿Bq1(q1;q2) = Cq1(q1;q2) (2)
￿Bq2(q1;q2) = Cq2(q1;q2) (3)
The optimal quality for dimension 1 is determined such that the marginal bene￿t from
the price plus the altruistic component are equal to the marginal disutility of providing
quality. The optimal quality for dimension 2 is determined such that the marginal bene￿t
from the altruistic component is equal to the marginal disutility.
In the Appendix we show that when the Second Order Conditions (SOCs) are satis￿ed
then Uq1q1Uq2q2 ￿ U2















A higher price always increases quality dimension 1 whenever the SOC condition is
satis￿ed (
@q1
@p > 0). This follows since a higher price increases the provider￿ s marginal
bene￿t of providing the veri￿able quality. He therefore responds by increasing q1:
The e⁄ect of an increased price on the non-veri￿able quality q2 depends on whether the
two quality dimensions are substitutes, independent or complements in patients￿bene￿ts
and provider￿ s cost.1
From equation (4) it follows that an increase in price decreases quality dimension 2
when the two quality dimensions are substitutes in patient￿ s bene￿t and in provider￿ s
cost. If the patient￿ s bene￿t and provider￿ s cost function is separable in the two quality
dimensions then a higher price has no e⁄ect on quality 2 but still increases quality 1. A
1The two quality dimensions are substitutes in patient￿ s bene￿t and in provider￿ s cost if Cq1q2 > 0 and
Bq1q2 < 0, or if (￿Bq1q2 ￿ Cq1q2) < 0. The two quality dimensions are independent if the patient￿ s bene￿t
and provider￿ s disutility function is separable in the two quality dimensions (Bq1q2 = Cq1q2 = 0). The
two quality dimensions are complements in patient￿ s bene￿t and in provider￿ s cost when Cq1q2 < 0 and
Bq1q2 > 0, or if (￿Bq1q2 ￿ Cq1q2) > 0:
6higher price increases quality 2 if the two quality dimensions are complements in patient￿ s
bene￿t and in provider￿ s cost. In this case introducing a positive price is clearly welfare
improving for the patients (compared to no price) although there is still an issue of how
to set the optimal price.
Finally if the constraint q2 ￿ 0 is binding with strict equality (which arises when
￿Bq2 ￿ Cq2 < 0), then the FOC for quality 1 is:
p + ￿Bq1(q1;q2 = 0) = Cq1(q1;q2 = 0) (5)
and @q1=@p = 1=(￿Uq1q1) > 0.
2.2 The purchaser
The purchaser maximises the di⁄erence between patients￿bene￿t and the transfers to the
provider B(q1;q2) ￿ T ￿ pq1 subject to the participation constraint: U ￿ 0 or T + pq1 ￿
C(q1;q2) ￿ ￿B(q1;q2). Since this is binding with equality, the problem becomes:2
max
p￿0
W = (1 + ￿)B(q1(p);q2(p)) ￿ C(q1(p);q2(p)) (6)
subject to:
p + ￿Bq1(q1;q2) ￿ Cq1(q1;q2) ￿ 0; q1 ￿ 0 (7)
￿Bq2(q1;q2) ￿ Cq2(q1;q2) ￿ 0; q2 ￿ 0; (8)
where the inequalities in the incentive￿ compatibility constraints hold with complementary
slackness. The question is: will a strictly positive price increase the purchaser￿ s utility?
2We could assume instead that the purchaser maximises a utilitarian welfare function. De￿ne ￿ as the
opportunity cost of public funds. Then a utilitarian welfare function is given by B￿(1 + ￿)(T + pq1)+U,
which after substituting for U = 0 and setting T + pq1 = C ￿ ￿B, provides B(1 + ￿ + ￿￿) ￿ (1 + ￿)C.
This formulation is similar to Boadway, Marchand and Sato (2004). Chalkley and Malcomson (1998b)
argue that this formulation leads to double counting of the altruistic component, and that the altruistic
component into the welfare function should be excluded. If this approach is followed instead, then the
welfare function is instead: B(1 + ￿￿) ￿ (1 + ￿)C. These alternative formulations would not qualitative
impact on our main results.
7The trade-o⁄ is that a higher price increases quality in dimension 1 and therefore welfare,
but might also reduce quality in dimension 2, which reduces welfare.
The FOC with respect to price, if an interior solution exists (q2 ￿ 0 is not binding
with strict equality), is:3
dW(q1(p);q2(p))
dp
= [(1 + ￿)Bq1 ￿ Cq1](@q1=@p) + [(1 + ￿)Bq2 ￿ Cq2](@q2=@p) = 0 (9)
By using the provider￿ s FOCs (￿Bq1 ￿ Cq1 = ￿p), the optimal price is given by




The optimal price is set equal to the marginal bene￿t of quality 1 adjusted for the the ratio
of the responsiveness of the two quality dimensions to price times the marginal bene￿t
of quality 2. From this it follows that the optimal price will be above, equal or below
the marginal bene￿t of quality 1 depending on whether the two quality dimensions are
substitutes, independent or complements in patients￿bene￿ts and provider￿ s cost. If the
two dimensions are substitutes then the optimal price is below the marginal bene￿t of
quality 1: p￿ < Bq1 (q1(p￿);q2(p￿)). If a higher price has no e⁄ect on quality 2, then the
price is equal to the marginal bene￿t of quality 1: p￿ = Bq1 (q1(p￿);q2(p￿)). Finally, if
the two dimensions are complements, then the price is set above the marginal bene￿t of
quality 1, p￿ > Bq1 (q1(p￿);q2(p￿)).
If the optimal price is above the marginal bene￿t of quality 1, p￿ ￿ Bq1, we call the
incentives high-powered. Similarly, if p￿ < Bq1; then the incentives are low-powered.
Notice that if the two dimensions are substitutes, then there is always a level of p = p
such that the level of quality 2 is zero. Analytically, if @q2=@p < 0 then 9p ￿ p such that






= [(1 + ￿)Bq1 ￿ Cq1](@q1=@p) ? 0: (11)
3In the Appendix we show that the SOC is satis￿ed and the problem is well behaved.
8The point is that when quality 2 is zero and price is above p, then a marginal increase in
price can be welfare improving (reducing) if the marginal bene￿t from quality 1 is larger
(smaller) than the marginal cost.
De￿ne psb as the second best solution price. We de￿ne this price second best because
one dimension of quality is not contractible. In the next section 3, we derive the optimal
price under the ￿rst best, i.e. when the two dimensions of quality are contractible.
The following proposition establishes conditions that ensure psb = p￿. As we show
below, psb can be di⁄erent from p￿ de￿ned above.
Proposition 1 Suppose that: (i) Bq1(p = 0) ￿ Bq2(p = 0); (ii) (￿￿Bq2q2 + Cq2q2) >
(Cq1q2 ￿ ￿Bq1q2) > 0; (iii) dW(q1(p);q2(p) = 0)=dpjp=p < 0. Then, dW(p = 0)=dp > 0
and the optimal price is below the marginal bene￿t of quality 1:
psb = p￿ = Bq1 ￿ Bq2 (Cq1q2 ￿ ￿Bq1q2)=(￿￿Bq2q2 + Cq2q2) < Bq1: (12)
The incentive scheme is low powered.
Proof. Appendix. ￿
Suppose that conditions (i-iii) in Proposition 1 hold. Then the price is positive (condi-
tion i), the tasks are substitutes in the patients￿bene￿t and provider￿ s cost (condition ii)
and the sponsor prefers that both dimensions of quality are provided (condition iii). This
case resembles situations where both dimensions of quality are important for the sponsor
but each dimensions of quality has a negative impact on the cost and bene￿ts of the other
quality dimension. In these cases, the price is positive, but low-powered since a too high
price will crowd-out valuable quality on the non-veri￿able task.
The conditions i-iii) in Proposition 1 are su¢ cient but not necessary for psb = p￿. A
necessary but not su¢ cient condition for Proposition 1 to hold is: Bq1 (￿￿Bq2q2 + Cq2q2) >
Bq2 (Cq1q2 ￿ ￿Bq1q2). This condition guarantees that dW=dp(p = 0) > 0 and that p￿ > 0;
but it does not establish whether p￿ generates maximum welfare. Whether it does it
depends of how the welfare function varies with p for p > p: If dW=dpjp=p > 0, then p￿
9might not be a maximum. We come back to this point below.
Figure 1.a and 1.b show the solution. Figure 1.b illustrates that condition (iii) in
proposition 1 is a su¢ cient but not necessary condition for psb = p￿.4 Figure 1.b shows
the case where dW=dpjp=p > 0 but still psb = p￿. In Figure 1.b, the price e p denotes the







[Figure 1.a and 1.b]
If the optimal price psb = p￿ is positive, then the FOC can be rewritten as:
[(1 + ￿)Bq1 ￿ Cq1](@q1=@p) = [(1 + ￿)Bq2 ￿ Cq2](￿@q2=@p) (13)
The optimal price is such that the marginal welfare gain from an increase in quality
dimension 1 is equal to the marginal welfare loss from a reduction in quality dimension 2.








qi = @W=@qi(qi=W) denotes the elasticity of welfare with respect to quality di-
mension i and ￿
qi
p = @qi=@p(p=qi) the elasticity of quality i with respect to price. The
optimal price is such that the product of the elasticity of welfare with respect to quality
and the elasticity of quality with respect to price are equated.5
In some cases the purchaser will set the optimal price equal to zero. Intuitively, these
are the cases where quality on dimension 2 is relatively more important for the sponsor,
and when a positive price shifts the provider￿ s choice of quality production towards the
￿rst task. The following proposition provides a su¢ cient condition for having no incentive
scheme, ie for setting psb = 0.
4The cost and bene￿t functions are assumed to be quadratic. See section 4 for details. In Figure 1.a
and 1.b we assume a1 = a2 = b1 = b2 = c1 = c2 = 1. For Figure 1.a we set ￿ = 0:5 and m = 0:5. For
Figure 1.b we set ￿ = 0:25 and m = 0:5.









10Proposition 2 Suppose that: (i) at p = 0, Bq1 (￿￿Bq2q2 + Cq2q2) < Bq2 (Cq1q2 ￿ ￿Bq1q2)
where (Cq1q2 ￿ ￿Bq1q2) > 0; (ii) dW(q1(p);q2(p) = 0)=dpjp=p < 0. Then, dW(p = 0)=dp <
0 and psb = 0. The incentive scheme breaks down.
Proof. Appendix. ￿
Figure 2.a and 2.b illustrate the solution.6 Intuitively, since the marginal bene￿t
of quality dimension 1 is small compared to quality dimension 2, introducing a price
reduces welfare. Condition (ii) in proposition 2 is su¢ cient. As ￿gure 2.b shows, even if
dW=dpjp=p > 0, it may still be optimal to set psb = 0.
[Figure 2.a and 2.b]
The following two propositions establish conditions for having high-powered incentive
schemes.
Proposition 3 Suppose that: (i) dW(q1(p);q2(p) = 0)=dpjp=p > 0; (ii) W(e p) > W(p￿)
or W(e p) > W(p = 0). Then, psb = e p = Bq1: The incentive scheme is high powered.
Proof. Appendix. ￿
Assumption i) ensures that welfare increases for p > p up to price p = e p. In words,
when quality 2 is driven to zero, a marginal increase in price p is such that the marginal
bene￿t from quality 1 is bigger than its marginal cost. This might be the case when the
level of altruism is su¢ ciently low, so that quality 2 quickly drops to zero when price
increases. Condition ii) guarantees that p = e p is the global maximum.
Figures 3.a-3.c show three possible scenarios. In Figure 3.a we have dW(p = 0)=dp < 0.
In this case an increase in the price reduces welfare for low p because it reduces a lot
quality 2. However, reached price p = p, the level of quality 2 is zero and therefore given
assumption i) welfare increases after that up to price p = e p. Condition (ii) guarantees that
p = e p is the global maximum. In Figure 3.b we have dW(p = 0)=dp > 0. There is a local
6In Figure 2.a and 2.b we assume a1 = b1 = c1 = c2 = 1, a2 = 2; b2 = 0 and m = 0:5. For Figure 2.a
we set ￿ = 0:2; while ￿ = 0:1 for Figure 2.b.
11maximum at p = p￿. Again reached price p = p, the level of quality 2 is zero and therefore
given our assumption in (i) welfare increases after that up to price p = e p. Condition (ii)
guarantees that p = e p is the global maximum. In Figure 3.a and 3.b it is always the case
that p￿ < p < e p. Figure 3.c provides an example where p < p￿ < e p.7
[Figure 3.a, 3.b, and 3.c]
Finally, our next proposition states that the incentive scheme is always high-powered
when the two quality dimensions are complements in the provider￿ s cost or patient￿ s bene￿t
function, i.e. when Cq1q2 ￿ ￿Bq1q2 < 0.
Proposition 4 Suppose that: (i) the two quality dimensions are complements: Cq1q2 ￿
￿Bq1q2 < 0. Then, psb = p￿ = Bq1 + Bq2 (￿Cq1q2 + ￿Bq1q2)=(￿￿Bq2q2 + Cq2q2) > Bq1.
The incentive scheme is high powered.
Proof. Appendix. ￿
The optimal price is set above the marginal bene￿t of quality dimension 1. In this case
we do not need to worry about the constraint q2 ￿ 0, because it is always satis￿ed with
strict inequality. This is because dq2=dp > 0. Since an increase in price increases not only
quality 1 but also quality 2, then it is optimal to increase the price at a level where the
marginal bene￿t of quality 1 is above its marginal cost ((1 + ￿)Bq1 > Cq1). The optimal
price is such that
[(1 + ￿)Bq2 ￿ Cq2](@q2=@p) = ￿[(1 + ￿)Bq1 ￿ Cq1](@q1=@p): (15)
In equilibrium the marginal welfare gain from an increase in quality 2 is equal to the
marginal welfare loss from an increase in quality 1.
7In Figure 3.a -3.c we assume a1 = b1 = c1 = c2 = 1, and m = 0:5. For Figure 3.a we set a2 = 2; b2 = 0
￿ = 0:05; for Figure 3.b a2 = b2 = 1; ￿ = 0:2; and in Figure 3.c. a2 = b2 = 1 ￿ = 0:1:
123 Comparison with ￿rst best
In this section we ￿rst de￿ne the ￿rst best solution and then compare the results obtained
in Propositions 1-4, which we refer to as the second best solution, with the ￿rst best
solution.
3.1 First best
We de￿ne the ￿rst best solution a setting where the purchaser can observe both quality
dimensions and maximize over the quality levels directly. This is equivalent to set two
di⁄erent prices p1 and p2 for respectively q1 and q2. The purchaser maximises the di⁄erence
between bene￿t and transfers
max
p1￿0;p2￿0
W = (1 + ￿)B(q1(p1);q2(p2)) ￿ C(q1(p1);q2(p2)) (16)
subject to the provider￿ s participation constraint and the incentive-compatibility (IC)
constraints. (The IC-constraints follow from the provider￿ s ￿rst order conditions).
T + pq1 + p2q2 + ￿B(q1;q2) ￿ C(q1;q2) ￿ 0 (17)
p1 + ￿Bq1(q1;q2) ￿ Cq1(q1;q2) ￿ 0; q1 ￿ 0
p2 + ￿Bq2(q1;q2) ￿ Cq2(q1;q2) ￿ 0; q2 ￿ 0:
The FOCs with respect to price are:
dW(q1(p1);q2(p2))
dp1
= [(1 + ￿)Bq1 ￿ Cq1](@q1=@p1) = 0
dW(q1(p1);q2(p2))
dp2
= [(1 + ￿)Bq2 ￿ Cq2](@q2=@p2) = 0 (18)











; i = 1;2 (19)
q
fb
i : (1 + ￿)Bqi = Cqi; i = 1;2: (20)
Hence, the price of each quality dimension is set equal to the marginal bene￿t this dimen-
sion generates. Furthermore, marginal costs along each dimension of quality are equal to
the marginal bene￿t from quality plus the the altruistic component.
3.2 Comparison of ￿rst best and second best
We start by comparing prices of quality dimension 1. However since both the marginal
bene￿t and the marginal cost of quality 1 depends on the level of quality 2 we are not
able to compare prices and quality levels without making further assumptions. To com-
pare prices we assume that marginal bene￿t of quality dimension 1 is constant, and that
marginal bene￿t of quality 1 is independent of quality 2. The following corollary compares
solutions.8
Corollary 1 Suppose Bq1q1 = Bq1q2 = 0: i) If the conditions in Proposition 1 hold then
p
fb
1 > psb. ii) If the conditions in Proposition 3 hold then p
fb
1 = psb: iii) Suppose the





The Corollary shows that the second best price coincides with ￿rst best price only
when quality 2 is zero in the second best. However, the real allocations, i.e. the choice of




This implies that welfare will di⁄er in ￿rst- and second best. We now turn to comparing
the level of quality under the two settings.
8Obvioulsy, when the price in second best is zero (Proposition 2), the ￿rst best price is higher.
14Comparing the levels of quality is not straightforward. The problem is that even if
we can rank the prices for quality 1, marginal costs of quality 1 depends on the level of
quality 2. To compare the levels of quality we impose the following restrictions. First,
we assume that marginal bene￿t of quality 1 is constant and that the bene￿t function
is symmetric, Bq1q1 = Bq2q2 = Bq1q2 = 0, so that Bq1 = Bq2 = B: Second, let the cost
function be symmetric, Cq1q1 = Cq2q2: (For simplicity) let the third-order derivatives on
costs be zero so Cqiqi = c > Cqiqj = m > 0; where the inequality follows from the second-
order conditions of the provider￿ s maximization problem.9
Under these assumptions it follows from equation (19) and (20) that prices and quality
for both tasks are identical in the ￿rst best. Furthermore, it follows from the provider￿ s
￿rst-order conditions (equation (2) and (3)) that Cqsb
1 (qsb
1 ;qsb
2 ) > Cqsb
2 (qsb
1 ;qsb
2 ) if and only
if psb > 0: The following lemma compares quality levels in second best.
Lemma 1 Let i) Bq1q2 = Bq1q1 = Bq2q2 = 0; ii) Bq1 = Bq2; and iii) Cq1q1 = Cq2q2: If
psb > 0; then Cqsb
1 (qsb
1 ;qsb
2 ) > Cqsb
2 (qsb
1 ;qsb




Hence, when costs and bene￿ts are symmetric in the two quality dimensions, quality
along the veri￿able dimension is higher than on the non-veri￿able quality dimension if the
second best price is strictly positive.




















(1 + ￿ ￿ C)
; (22)








￿ = Cq1q1Cq2q2 ￿ (Cq1q2)













Obviously, the conditions given in (23) holds for qfb > qsb
1 > qsb
2 : The following proposition
gives an upper boundary for qsb
2 in the case where qfb < qsb
1 :
Proposition 5 Suppose the conditions in Lemma 1 hold and qsb
1 > qsb
2 : If qfb < qsb
1 then
i) qsb









Hence, if qfb < qsb
1 ; then quality along the second dimension is below the ￿rst best
quality level. Furthermore, aggregate quality is lower in the second best compared with the
￿rst best. Since patients￿marginal bene￿t on both quality dimensions is equal, patients
bene￿ts are higher in the ￿rst best.
4 Comparative statics of price
In this section we provide some comparative statics results in the case where bene￿t and
costs are quadratic. Suppose that B(q1;q2) = a1q1 ￿ (b1=2)q2




2 + mq1q2: By solving the provider￿ s ￿rst order conditions
(equation (2) and (3)) for the quality levels we obtain
q￿
1(p) =
(p + ￿a1)(c2 + ￿b2) ￿ m￿a2
c1c2 + ￿b1c2 + ￿b2c1 + ￿2b1b2 ￿ m2 (24)
q￿
2(p) =
￿a2 (c1 + ￿b1) ￿ m(p + ￿a1)
c1c2 + ￿b1c2 + ￿b2c1 ￿ m2 + ￿2b1b2
Then, the optimal price is (follows from equation (10)):




First, we consider the case where marginal bene￿t is constant. In this case the optimal
16price is decreasing (increasing) in Cq1q2 = m > 0(< 0): That is, it decreasing (increasing)
when the two quality dimensions are substitutes (complements) in the provider￿ s cost
function. Then we show that if marginal bene￿ts are decreasing, the optimal price can be
increasing in Cq1q2 = m even in the case where the quality dimensions are substitutes in
the provider￿ s cost function, i.e. when m > 0:
4.1 Constant marginal bene￿t
Suppose that the marginal bene￿t is constant (b1 = b2 = 0). Then the optimal price is




Notice that if the marginal bene￿t of quality 2 is su¢ ciently high and the marginal cost
su¢ ciently low, then p￿ might be negative, in which case psb = 0. In the following we
assume that p￿ is positive.
The optimal price psb is increasing in the marginal bene￿t of quality 1 and decreasing
in the marginal bene￿t of quality 2. The price is decreasing in m, as expected: the more
the two quality dimensions are substitutes, the smaller is the price (@p=@m < 0).
The higher the marginal cost of dimension 2 the higher is the price (@p=@c2 = a2m=c2
2 >
0). This is somewhat counter-intuitive, but follows from the fact that an increase in the
marginal cost of quality 2 reduces quality 2 and thus the marginal cost of quality 1. Since
marginal bene￿t is constant the provider￿ s ￿rst-order condition (equation 2) is violated if
the price remains constant, i.e. psb￿￿a1 > Cq1(q1;q2￿￿); where ￿ > 0 is the reduction in
quality 2 that follows the increase in marginal cost of quality 2. The payer thus responds
to an increase in the marginal cost of quality 2, c2, by increasing the price, which as showed
below, increases the level of quality 1.
Finally, notice that price does not vary with altruism nor with the marginal cost of
quality 1 (as price is equal to marginal bene￿t). Note that the above results also hold for
small b1 and b2 (i.e. for b1 ! 0 and b2 ! 0).
17Substituting the optimal price into the FOCs of the provider, we obtain
q￿
1 =
(1 + ￿)(a1c2 ￿ ma2)
c1c2 ￿ m2 ; q￿
2 =
￿(a2c1 ￿ ma1) ￿ m
c2(a1c2 ￿ ma2)
c1c2 ￿ m2 : (27)
The following corollary establishes how the optimal levels of quality vary with the di⁄erent
parameters.
Corollary 2 Suppose p￿ > 0: (a) @q￿
i =@ai > 0 with i = 1;2; (b) @q￿
i =@aj < 0 with j = 1;2
and i 6= j; (c) @q￿
i =@ci < 0 with i = 1;2; (d) @q￿
i =@cj > 0 with j = 1;2 and i 6= j; (e)
@q￿
i =@￿ > 0 with i = 1;2; (f) @q￿
i =@m ? 0 with i = 1;2.
Proof. Appendix. ￿
The e⁄ect of each parameter on quality re￿ ects the sum of the direct e⁄ect on quality
plus the indirect e⁄ect through the price (see equation (24)).
(a) Corollary 1 suggests that each quality level is increasing in its marginal bene￿ts
(@q￿
i =@ai > 0, i = 1;2): a higher marginal bene￿t from quality implies a higher price but
also a stronger altruistic component for the provider. Both e⁄ects induce higher quality
in equilibrium.
(b) Each quality level is decreasing in the marginal bene￿t of the other quality dimen-
sion (@q￿
i =@aj < 0; i = j = 1;2 and i 6= j). For example, an increase in a1 decreases q￿
2 for
two reasons: for a given price, a higher marginal bene￿t of quality 1 decreases quality 2
but also implies a higher price which also decreases quality 2.
(c) Each quality level is also decreasing in its own marginal cost, i.e. @q￿
i =@ci < 0;
i = 1;2. A higher marginal cost for quality 1, c1, decreases quality 1 (direct e⁄ect) and
has no e⁄ect on price (follows from equation (26)). A higher marginal cost for quality 2,
c2, decreases quality 2 (direct e⁄ect). In this case there is also an indirect e⁄ect via the
price; an increase in c2 increases the price which further decreases quality 2.
(d) Each quality level is increasing in the marginal cost of the other quality dimension.
A higher marginal cost for quality 2 c2 reduces the optimal quality 2 and therefore reduces
the marginal cost of quality 1 which increases quality 1; moreover it implies a higher price
18which also increases quality 1. Similarly, a higher marginal cost of quality 1 c1 reduces
the optimal quality 1 and therefore reduces the marginal cost of quality 2 which increases
quality 2 (there is no e⁄ect through the price).
(e) Higher altruism increases the marginal bene￿t of quality and therefore increases
quality (direct e⁄ect) and has no e⁄ect on the price.
(f) The e⁄ects of an increase in m is symmetric so we only consider the e⁄ect on q1. A
higher m implies a more negative spillover e⁄ect of a high level of q1 on the marginal cost
of providing quality 2. This e⁄ect tends to reduce quality 1. However, a higher m also
implies a tendency to reduce q2 : this e⁄ect tends to increase q1: Which e⁄ect dominates
depends on the relative size of the marginal costs of producing q1 and q2; and the relative
marginal bene￿ts (a1 and a2). If the relative bene￿ts favour quality dimension 1 (a1 large
relative to a2; and large relative to marginal costs) then q1 tends to increase with m; while
q2 tends to decrease with m: A similar result occurs if the marginal cost of providing q1
is relatively small to the marginal costs of providing q2 (and the di⁄erence in marginal
bene￿ts is small).
4.2 Decreasing marginal bene￿t
We now consider the case with decreasing marginal bene￿t. The point we want to make
is that the e⁄ects of an increase in m are quite complicated and most often indeterminate
when the marginal bene￿t is decreasing. It might indeed be the case that the price is
actually increasing in m: This happens when marginal bene￿ts decreases su¢ ciently fast.
The optimal price is now given by:




















































If b1 = b2 = 0 we obtain as a special case the previous result, so that dpsb=dm < 0.
To show that the optimal price can increase in m > 0 when the marginal bene￿t
decreases su¢ ciently fast, let ￿ = 0:8; a1 = a2 = b1 = b2 = 2; and let c1 = c2 = 1: The
next ￿gure shows that dpsb=dm > 0 for m > 0:10
[Figure 4]
5 Conclusions
Purchasers make increased use of pay-for-performance incentive schemes in the attempt of
fostering quality in the health care sector. However, inevitably some dimensions of quality
remain not contractible. Existing incentive schemes have been criticised on the ground
that paying for quality will increase quality in the dimensions that are contractible but
will reduce quality for the dimensions that are not contractible. This criticism then raises
the question whether such incentive schemes should be introduced, and if introduced how
powered should the incentive schemes be.
We show that in some cases low powered incentive schemes are optimal. Introducing
the scheme is useful in increasing welfare when the quality that is contractible is relatively
important. However, this needs to be traded-o⁄ with the reductions in the quality dimen-
10With these parameter values q1 > 0;q2 > 0; and the SOC is full￿led.
20sion that is not contractible. In other cases it is optimal not to introduce an incentive
scheme. This is likely to be the case when the quality dimensions that are not contractible
are relatively more important.
Finally, there are some cases where the optimal incentive scheme is high powered. This
arises in two circumstances. First, if the quality dimension that is not contractible falls to
zero quickly with price (due for example to low altruism), the bene￿t from increasing the
quality in the dimensions that are contractible can be quite large. Second, if the di⁄erent
quality dimensions face some complementarity, then providers become better at providing
also the dimensions of quality that are not contractible, when induced to increase the
quality dimensions that are contractible.
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227 Appendix
In this appendix we provide details regarding some of the calculations in this paper.
The second order conditions (SOCs) of the provider￿ s problem are:
Uq1q1 = ￿Bq1q1 ￿ Cq1q1 < 0; Uq2q2 = ￿Bq2q2 ￿ Cq2q2 < 0 (31)
Uq1q1Uq2q2 ￿ U2
q2q1 = (￿Bq1q1 ￿ Cq1q1)(￿Bq2q2 ￿ Cq2q2) ￿ (￿Bq1q2 ￿ Cq1q2)
2 > 0(32)
A su¢ cient but not necessary condition for Uq1q1Uq2q2 ￿ U2
q2q1 > 0 to be satis￿ed is
Cq1q1Cq2q2 > C2
q1q2 and Bq1q1Bq2q2 > B2
q1q2.
To ￿nd the e⁄ects @qi=@p; i = 1;2 we use Cramer￿ s rule. De￿ne
F1 (q1;q2;p;￿) = p + ￿Bq1(q1;q2) ￿ Cq1(q1;q2) = 0
F2 (q1;q2;p;￿) = ￿Bq2(q1;q2) ￿ Cq2(q1;q2) = 0:






￿Bq1q1 ￿ Cq1q1 ￿Bq1q2 ￿ Cq1q2





= Uq1q1Uq2q2 ￿ U2
q2q1 > 0;
where the last inequality follows from the assumption that the SOC is satis￿ed.








￿1 ￿Bq1q2 ￿ Cq1q2


















￿Bq1q1 ￿ Cq1q1 ￿1











23The SOC of the sponsor￿ s problem is satis￿ed and the problem is well behaved since
d2W
d2p
= [(1 + ￿)Bq1q1 ￿ Cq1q1](@q1=@p)
2 + [(1 + ￿)Bq2q2 ￿ Cq2q2](@q2=@p)
2 < 0:






= [(1+￿)Bq1 ￿Cq1](@q1=@p)+[(1+￿)Bq2 ￿






= (Bq1 ￿ p)(@q1=@p) + Bq2 (@q2=@p)
=




Bq1 (￿￿Bq2q2 + Cq2q2) + Bq2 (￿Cq1q2 + ￿Bq1q2) ￿ p(￿￿Bq2q2 + Cq2q2)
Uq1q1Uq2q2 ￿ U2
q2q1
Therefore, at p = 0 the condition is positive when (i) and (ii) are satis￿ed. ￿







Bq1 (￿￿Bq2q2 + Cq2q2) + Bq2 (￿Cq1q2 + Bq1q2) ￿ p(￿￿Bq2q2 + Cq2q2)
Uq1q1Uq2q2 ￿ U2
q2q1











Condition (i) is only necessary. ￿






= [(1+￿)Bq1 ￿Cq1](@q1=@p). Using the






= (Bq1 ￿ p)(@q1=@p) = 0, which implies
e p = Bq1. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4. In this case the quality dimension 2 is always strictly positive,
q2 > 0 and therefore p = e p cannot be in equilibrium. The solution is given by p￿. ￿
Proof of Corollary 1. To prove the ￿rst statement, recall that p
fb
1 = Bq1; Cq1q2 < 0;
and psb = Bq1 + Bq2 (￿Cq1q2)=(￿￿Bq2q2 + Cq2q2). Note that since Bq1q1 = 0, then Bq1
24is a constant. Therefore, since Bq2 (￿Cq1q2)=(￿￿Bq2q2 + Cq2q2) > 0 then p
fb
1 > psb. The
second statement follows since psb = e p = Bq1 when the conditions in Proposition 3 holds.
The proof of the last statement follows along similar lines as the ￿rst statement but now
Cq1q2 < 0: ￿
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose q1 = q2 = q: Then Cq1 = Cq2 = K (by symmetry of the
cost function). Let ￿ > 0: Then (starting in a symmetric situation)
K1 ￿ Cq1(q + ￿;q) ￿ K + c￿ > K + m￿ ￿ Cq2(q + ￿;q) ￿ K2:
Now, let q1 = q + ￿ > q2 (starting in an asymmetric situation).
Cq1(q1 + ￿;q2) ￿ K1 + c￿ > K2 + m￿ ￿ Cq2(q1 + ￿;q2):
Since ￿ can be chosen arbitrarily small the approximation should hold. Furthermore,
symmetry ensures that Cq1 ￿ Cq2 () q2 ￿ q1: ￿
Proof of Proposition 5. We have























Hence, if qfb < qsb
1 ; then quality along the second dimension cannot be too high.
The second statement follows since qfb ￿ qsb



































































2 (c1c2 ￿ m2)
￿ c1
￿
￿(a2c1 ￿ ma1) ￿ m




















m(1 + ￿)(a2c1 ￿ ma1)
(c1c2 ￿ m2)





















c1c2 ￿ m2 > 0
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@m R 0 depending on the parameter values. ￿
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Case 3: Incentive scheme is high powered












Figure 4. Optimal price as a function of m
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